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Non-Technical Summary
Transaction costs and risk have generally not been taken into account in assessing the
efficiency gains associated with alternative policy instruments for the reduction of GHG
emissions. However, as past experience in other policy areas has shown, they can have a
significant influence. It is quite possible, with regard to the Kyoto Mechanisms, that
these cost elements may prevent the undertaking of projects that are otherwise cost-
effective and even lead to the exclusion of some countries from participating in JI and
CDM-projects.
The factor that most determines the influence of transaction costs on the implementation
of a project is the size of the project. For some projects transaction costs amount up to
over 1000 €/ton C reduced, which proves the necessity of streamlining procedures, as
recognised in the Marrakesh Accords. A reduction of transaction costs can be achieved
through the bundling of projects, streamlining of information and the development of
standardised procedures. 
For international emissions trading it will be of high importance to build on experience
with past national emissions trading schemes in order to keep transaction costs low.
However, international trading schemes of the type envisaged under the Kyoto Protocol
are likely to pose significant problems, such as the design of the permit allocation
mechanism and its distributional impact, that have not been addressed in great depth in
previous national experience. This, combined with the likelihood that transaction costs
will decline over time due to learning effects, underlines the importance of establishing
a European permit market in the near future in order to get acquainted with such a
system before the Kyoto period 2008-2012. 
In addition to transaction costs, projects in different sovereign states may attract
different risk premia owing to the perceived level of risk of default or project failure due
to micro-level or macro-level factors. We determine country risk premia and recognise
the need to determine project type risk premia in future research.
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Abstract
Transaction costs and risk have generally not been taken into account in assessing the
Kyoto mechanisms JI, CDM and emissions trading. However, they can have a
significant influence. With regard to the project-based mechanisms, the factor that most
determines the influence of transaction costs on the implementation of a project is the
size of the particular project. For some projects transaction costs amount up to over
1000 €/ton C reduced, which proves the necessity of streamlining procedures, as
recognised in the Marrakesh Accords. With regard to international emissions trading it
will be of high importance to build on experience with past national emissions trading
schemes in order to keep transaction costs low. However, international trading schemes
of the type envisaged under the Kyoto Protocol are likely to have significant issues that
have not been addressed in previous national experience. In addition to transaction
costs, we determine country risk premia to account for the fact that projects in different
states may induce different levels of risk of default or project failure.
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11 Introduction
Within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol the industrialised countries committed
themselves to a reduction of their greenhouse gas emissions during the period from
2008 to 2012. The flexible mechanisms defined within the Kyoto Protocol are designed
to achieve cost-effectiveness of emissions reduction by allowing countries to reduce
emissions abroad, either in other Annex B countries, or in non Annex B countries.
However, in determining the split of reduction measures between abroad and at home,
transaction cost and risk elements that might be associated with the operation of these
instruments  are not usually taken into account. This paper evaluates the importance of
transaction costs and risk premia with respect to the flexibility mechanisms of the
Kyoto Protocol. It examines their effect on the up-take of these policy instruments and
provides information on how to reduce these cost elements.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a generic classification of various
types of transaction costs. Section 3 presents estimates of transaction costs associated
with the flexible mechanisms, and section 4 those of project risk premia. Section 5
summarises and concludes.
2 The Nature of Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are those costs that arise from initiating and completing transactions,
such as finding partners, holding negotiations, consulting with lawyers or other experts,
monitoring agreements, etc. (Coase, 1937). Thus, simply being the costs that arise from
the transfer of any property right, they occur to some degree in all market transactions.
This feature of exchange therefore also applies to the so-called “flexibility
mechanisms” of the Kyoto Protocol (as they provide “geographical flexibility” to
Parties in fulfilling their commitments). These encompass Joint Implementation (JI) of
projects among industrialised countries, Joint Implementation between industrialised
and developing countries within the multilateral framework of the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) and the establishment of a scheme for International Emissions
Trading amongst industrialised countries (IET). 
2Table 1: Definition of Transaction Cost Components in the Kyoto Protocol
Flexibility Mechanisms.
Transaction Cost 
Components
Description
Project based (JI,CDM): Pre-implementation
Search costs Costs incurred by investors and hosts as they seek out partners for
mutually advantageous projects
Negotiation costs Includes those costs incurred in the preparation of the project design
document (i.a. baseline determination and monitoring rules) that also
documents assignment and scheduling of benefits over the project
time period. It also includes public consultation with key
stakeholders.
Validation Costs Review and revision of project design document by operational entity
Approval costs Registration and approval by UNFCCC Board and authorisation from
host country
Project based (JI,CDM): Implementation
Monitoring costs Costs needed to ensure that participants are fulfilling their obligations
Verification costs Annual verification by the UNFCCC Executive Board/ Supervisory
Committee
Certification costs Including issue of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs for CDM)
and issue of Emission Reduction Units (ERUs for JI) by UNFCCC
Executive Board
Enforcement Costs Includes costs of administrative and legal measures incurred in theevent of departure from the agreed transaction
International Emissions trading (IET)
Search costs Same as project based; to include e.g. market brokerage fees
Negotiating Costs To include legal and insurance fees associated with participation in
the market.
Monitoring costs Same as project based; to include annual verification
Certification costs Certification and issue of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) by
UNFCCC Ececutive Board
Enforcement Costs Includes costs of administrative and legal measures incurred in the
event of departure from the agreed transaction
Based on: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2000) and Dudek et. al. (1996); concerning JI the Second Track has
been considered.
The most obvious impact of transaction costs is that they raise the costs for the
participants of the transaction and therefore lower the trading volume or even
discourage some transactions from occurring. The efficiency gains from the use of
market based policy instruments are therefore constrained. Some empirical evidence is
provided by Hahn and Hester (1989) for the emission trading programme of the 1977
Amendments of the U.S. Clean Air Act, where the trading scheme has failed to achieve
its expected economic benefits due to high transaction costs. Coase (1960) argues that
the transaction costs of implementation, enforcement, etc. should determine at the
outset how pollution is controlled. In most policy simulations that provide magnitudes
3of efficiency gains from flexibility mechanisms, however, administrative or transaction
costs are not taken into account (cf. for example Böhringer and Löschel (2001) or
Klepper and Peterson (2002)).
In this paper transaction costs refer to the costs associated with the process of obtaining
JI or CDM recognition for a project and obtaining the resulting emission credits (OECD,
2001). Similarly for IET, transaction costs include the costs of obtaining emission
credits. Table 1 defines disaggregated cost components, which further sub-divide
transaction costs into categories that parallel – in the case of JI and CDM projects - the
project cycle. If a host country is out of compliance with certain eligibility requirements
(Article 5 and 7 of the Kyoto Protocol), JI has to follow more or less the CDM project
cycle, the so-called second track, which is considered in this paper. If a host country can
demonstrate compliance with its inventory and reporting requirements and registries, the
regulatory intensity is lowered.
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Figure 1: Inclusion of Transaction Costs.
The basic effects of transaction costs are illustrated in Figure 1, for the example of an
emission trading scheme. Without transaction costs the trade of emission permits
between companies will establish an international permit price that equals marginal
abatement costs across companies. The inclusion of transaction costs leads to a left-shift
(right-shift) of the supply curve (demand curve) if applied to sellers (buyers). As a
consequence the volume of trade decreases and the price rises from P0 to P1, indicating
4that more abatement will be undertaken domestically compared to a situation with no
transaction costs.
Particularly in the first stage of the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms, transaction costs are
likely to be an essential element in determining the degree of use of the mechanisms and
their shares. The level of these costs depends on the rules of the mechanism, the degree
of utilisation of the respective mechanism and on the degree of standardisation of
procedures. Presumably transaction costs will be higher in countries with an inefficient
regulatory framework, leading to a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis other countries.
Whilst the paucity of country level data on transaction costs does not allow us to explore
this issue in any depth in our analysis below, it is clearly a priority research area in the
effective implementation of the flexibility mechanisms.
3 Estimation of the Transaction Costs Associated
with the Flexibility Mechanisms Under the Kyoto Protocol
The great restriction under which this research has been undertaken is that since the
Kyoto Protocol has not yet been implemented, the flexibility mechanisms are not
formally in existence and so no real evidence of the magnitude of transaction costs
presently exists. Evidence therefore has to be based either upon:
 the pilot phase of the UNFCCC promoted Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ)
programme;
 the World Bank supported Prototype Carbon Fund;
 hypothetical estimates of cost components that have been constructed; 
 experience from the previous use of similar policy instruments - such as tradeable
permit schemes – in other policy contexts.
3.1 World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF)
The PCF, operated by the World Bank, provides funding to host partners who wish to
develop projects consistent with the JI/CDM mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. It
presently has about 50 projects operating, or in development. One project has formally
become a JI project, thereby accumulating emission reduction credits. As a result, it
5seems reasonable to assume that the transaction costs estimated for PCF projects
approximate closely to those that will exist under the implementation of JI in the Kyoto
Protocol - at least in the first commitment period, 2008 - 2012. 
Table 2: PCF Range of Pre-Implementation Transaction Cost Components.
Pre-Implementation
phase
Typical Cost
(Euro ‘000s)
Low Cost
(Euro ‘000s)
High Cost
(Euro ‘000s)
Negotiation 290 160 573
Approval N/A N/A N/A
Validation 20 20 35
Sub-total 310 180 608
10% contingency 31 18 61
Total: Pre-
Implementation 341 198 669
PCF transaction cost estimates are presented in Table 2 – Table 4 below. Data has been
supplied by staff at the PCF, though is not yet published, or in public circulation. We
have consequently been requested to make the country and project-specific data
supplied more generic. Accordingly, we have not specified the project host country, but
instead specified the world region in which the country is located. Table 2 presents the
high and low ranges, together with a “typical” or average, for the transaction costs
associated with the pre-implementation phase of the project cycle for the PCF projects.
The ranges reflect differences that exist in legal and institutional structures, data
availability and consultant expenses in different countries.
Sufficient information exists on seven projects for us to derive transaction costs per
tonne of carbon reduction and these estimates are presented in Table 3 and Table 4.
Table 3 shows, for two individual projects hosted by Annex B countries, (i.e. where JI
projects would be located), the associated transaction costs. Table 4 gives the same
information for non-Annex B countries where CDM projects would be located. We
assume, therefore, that estimates of transaction costs presented in Table 3 apply to JI -
type projects, while those in Table 4 apply to CDM - type projects.
To date, only one project has started and so there is little evidence on implementation
costs (e.g. monitoring, verification etc.). PCF estimates that these costs will total between
6Euro 100,000 - 200,000 (PCF, 2002). As a starting point, we have therefore assumed a
mid-point of Euro 150,000 in our calculations. 
Table 3: JI – Country Projects under PCF: Transaction Costs (TCs).
Ton C
Redn.
Project
lifetime
Ton C
Redn. p.a.
Pre-Imple-
mentation
Implemen-
tation
(Estimate)
Total
Project
TCs
TC/
Ton CCountry
Region
Sector
000s Yrs 000s Euro (000) Euro (000) Euro (000) Euro
CEA LUM 2880 15 192 220 150 370 0.13
CEA SER 560 25 22.4 287 150 437 0.78
Table 4: CDM – Country Projects under PCF: Transaction Costs.
Ton C
Redn.
Project
lifetime
Ton C
Redn. p.a.
Pre-Imple-
mentation
Implemen-
tation
(Estimate)
Total
Project
TCs
TC/
Ton CCountry
Region
Sector
000s Yrs 000s Euro (000) Euro (000) Euro (000) Euro
N.Afr ELE 1590 20 80 397 150 547 0.34
CAM AGR 684 8 86 482 150 632 0.92
S. Am 1 ELE 1081 50 22 150 150 300 0.27
S. Am 2 AGR 3070 21 146 220 150 370 0.12
S. Am 3 ELE 1600 20 80 176 150 326 0.20
Note: where possible the GTAP nomenclature of countries/regions is used. For entries where country data
is confidential, we classify the country according to world region. Thus, CEA = Central European
Associates; S. Asia = South Asia; S. America = South America; CAM = Central America; N.Afr. = North
Africa. There are three South American projects, and these are numbered to distinguish them; LUM =
Lumber and Wood; SER = Commercial and Public Services; ELE = Electricity and Heat; AGR =
Agricultural Products.
The figures reveal a correlation between project size (in terms of carbon reductions) and
transaction cost per ton of carbon reduced - as we would expect in the absence of any
size-related streamlining. Table 4 allows further sectoral and geographical comparison,
excepting the fact that the generic implementation cost is a constraint on drawing firm
conclusions. There is no pattern of correlation between the agricultural sector and the
electricity sector and their associated transaction costs per tonne of carbon. Indeed, the
estimates for the agricultural sector provide the high and low range limits. It is notable,
also, that the agricultural projects account for the largest and smallest total reductions in
carbon, of the small number of projects for which we have data - supporting the
argument that project size dominates sectoral differences. One other pattern that is
apparent is that those projects that are based in South America are lower than those in
other CDM host regions, though the explanation is not clear from the data available. 
73.2 UNFCCC Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) Projects
The UNFCC launched a pilot phase of Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) in 1995 –
prior to the proposed implementation of the Kyoto Protocol - in order to learn more
about the possible operation of JI and CDM projects under the Protocol’s flexibility
mechanisms and build confidence in this approach. The projects that have been
implemented under this initiative are therefore thought likely to reflect current UNFCCC
thinking on monitoring, and other requirements for establishing JI and CDM projects,
and the associated transaction costs. 
Table 5 presents a selection of the project-based AIJ evidence on transaction costs
available to date. Of the 157 AIJ projects proposed and/or initiated by March 2002, 70
have reported some of the above mentioned transaction cost elements whilst 25 projects
have transaction costs identifiable for all categories in both the pre-implementation and
implementation project phases. The cost categories reported in the Uniform Reporting
Forms (URFs) on the UNFCCC web-site that can be attributed to transaction cost
elements include: 
 administration costs (for capacity building);
 technical assistance (of consultants until project commissioned); 
 reporting (annual reporting to UNFCCC), and;
 follow-up (including monitoring and verification).
We interpret the administration costs and technical assistance elements as pre-
implementation costs, whilst the reporting and follow-up elements are taken to be
implementation costs. However, the reporting categories are not transparent in relation to
their interpretation as transaction costs. In reality, therefore, there is likely to be some
overlap of costs within these categories between the pre-implementation and
implementation project phases. It should also be noted that the vast majority of the
projects for which there is data have been undertaken by Sweden, whose implementing
agency has presented average annual implementation costs across all projects in the
individual project description.
Table 5 shows a wide variation in transaction costs per tonne of carbon reduced. The
variation is explained not so much by the differing absolute project transaction costs as
8by the differing carbon emission reductions associated with each project, i.e. project size.
The data has been sorted so that the lowest carbon reducing (smallest) projects are listed
at the top, and the largest at the bottom of the table. A strong negative correlation
between size of project and transaction cost per ton of carbon reduced is apparent. This
reflects the fact that so far little flexibility - in relation to project size - has been granted
to monitoring, verification etc., which determine transaction costs. In other words, no
streamlining is evident.
Table 5: AIJ Project Cycle Transaction Costs (Totals and per ton carbon reduced).
Sector Region Lifetime Ton C 
Redn. per 
annum
Total TC 
(Pre-Impl) 
'000 Euro
Pre-Impl Tran 
Cost/ Ton C
Total TC 
(Impl.) '000 
Euro
Impl. Tran 
Cost/ Ton C
Total TC 
'000 Euro
Total 
TC/Ton C
Ele CEA 10 39 160 410 53 136 213 547
Ser CEA 10 39 126 322 32 83 158 405
Ele CEA 10 46 165 356 43 93 208 449
Ele CEA 6 80 76 158 10 22 87 180
Ele CEA 10 71 164 232 33 46 197 279
Ele CEA 10 82 26 31 30 36 55 67
Ele CEA 10 90 77 85 32 35 109 120
Ele CEA 10 92 108 118 32 35 140 153
Dwe CEA 10 97 141 146 62 64 203 210
Dwe CEA 10 104 129 124 27 26 156 150
Ele CEA 10 115 155 135 78 67 232 202
Dwe CEA 10 128 241 189 62 48 303 237
Ele CEA 10 159 171 107 27 17 198 125
Ele CEA 10 228 135 59 30 13 165 72
Ele CEA 10 260 68 26 32 12 100 39
Ele CEA 10 323 101 31 32 10 133 41
Ele CEA 10 341 116 34 43 13 159 47
Ele CEA 10 845 88 10 32 4 120 14
Ele CEA 10 1119 154 14 30 3 184 16
Ele CEA 10 1178 154 13 30 3 184 16
Ele CEA 10 1510 114 8 32 2 147 10
Ele CEA 10 1916 173 9 53 3 226 12
Ele CEA 10 2082 35 2 30 1 65 3
Ele CEA 10 30651 127 0.4 32 0.1 159 0.5
Agr MEX 30 27994 153 0.2 43 0.1 196 0.2
Note: CEA = Central European Associates; MEX = Mexico; SER = Commercial and Public Services; ELE
= Electricity and heat; AGR = Agricultural Products.
Source: UNFCCC (2002), own calculations
3.3 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC)
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2000) estimates are constructed using different assumptions
regarding the number of organisations, or “operating entities”, (OEs), that are involved in
the activities that give rise to transaction costs over the project cycle. Three elements are
9identified, namely validation, verification and certification, that require different OEs if
possible conflicts of interests are to be avoided. Three “levels” of transaction costs are
therefore defined. 
 Level 1 assumes a single OE (OE1) to undertake all elements of the project cycle.
 Level 2 assumes that OE1 undertakes the validation in the pre-implementation phase,
whilst a second OE (OE2) undertakes the verification and certification in the
implementation phase.
 Level 3 assumes the same as Level 2 except that the verification is undertaken by
OE2 whilst a third OE (OE3) undertakes the certification.
Since the involvement of each additional OE requires that they have a detailed
knowledge of the project in order to carry out the prescribed functions, there maybe a
trade-off between the achievement of environmental goals of the project and the
transaction cost. This is because the additional OE(s) spend time acquainting themselves
with the project details, thereby adding to the transaction costs but ensuring (through the
avoidance of conflicts of interest) the achievement of the carbon reductions being
claimed. These assumptions, made in the year 2000, were primarily based on the
Consolidated Text (FCCC/SB/2000/4), and before COP6. The Marrakesh Accords,
agreed at COP7 in November 2001, explicitly rule out the possibility of Levels 2 and 3.
Therefore, whilst the full range of transaction costs are presented below, we only include
those from Level 1 estimates for further conclusions.
The transaction costs for five generic project types are presented in Table 7 – Table 11,
based on the following assumptions on the daily rates of OE employees:
 Project developers: range Euro 750 – 1200; central value Euro 1000;
 Project consultants -local engineers/NGOs in host country: Euro 200;
 International management consultancy in host country: Euro 300; 
 International management consultancy in OECD states: Euro 1500.
However, whilst the number of days are separately identified for the pre-implementation
and implementation phases in the PwC report, the split between the different day rate
categories is not made explicit. Nevertheless, as a first approximation, it is possible -
10
using the split of total days - to apportion the percentage of total transaction costs to the
two project phases. 
The emissions reduction estimates are obtained by multiplication of energy (per lifetime,
i.e. fifteen years for each of the projects) for the new plant (capacity x load factor x
131,400 h) with the difference between old and new emissions. Table 6 provides the data
for these calculations. Conversion from CO2 to carbon is achieved through division by
3.65. As a baseline for emissions we chose 800g/kWh for a coal burning power station.
PwC suggest a baseline of 944g/kWh for an Indian coal powered energy generator.
However, with many power stations having emissions much below 944g/kWh, this
baseline appeared to be too high. The figures for the load factor are rough estimates
based on IKARUS (KFA, 1994), a comprehensive techno-economic database which has
been developed for the German Ministry for Technology and Research.
Table 6: Carbon Reduction for Technologies Considered in PwC (2000).
G/kWh Load factor Reduction
(t/lifetime)
Reduction
(t/a)
Base (400MW) 800 -- -- --
CCGT(400MW) 365 0.79 4,948,560 329,904
RetrofitCCGT(") 365 0.79 4,948,560 329,904
Wind (50MW) 0 0.30 432,000 28,800
PV (1MW) 0 0.17 4,896 326
PV (100kW) 0 0.17 490 33
The resulting transaction costs (in Euro 2000 prices) are presented in Table 7 – Table 11
in absolute terms, and as Euro/ton carbon reduced, for the range of five projects.
Discussion with PwC1 points out that these results are to be taken as geographically
generic in the sense that there is no distinction made between countries or regions where
the CDM project would be located, since the data is averaged over a number of country
experiences.
                                                          
1 Ian Milborrow, PWC, personal communication, April 19, 2001
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Table 7: Transaction Costs (TCs) for new 400 MW Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
(CCGT) Plant.
CDM
Structure
Total TCs
(Euro
000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Phase 1 TCs
(Euro 000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Phase 2 TCs
(Euro 000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Level 1 558 0.11 103 0.02 455 0.09
Level 2 675 0.14 103 0.02 582 0.12
Level 3 1057 0.21 103 0.02 986 0.20
Table 8: Transaction Costs (TCs) for 400 MW Retrofit Project.
CDM
Structure
Total TCs
(Euro
000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Phase 1 TCs
(Euro 000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Phase 2 TCs
(Euro 000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Level 1 489 0.10 73 0.02 416 0.08
Level 2 584 0.11 73 0.02 511 0.10
Level 3 897 0.18 73 0.02 824 0.17
Table 9: Transaction Costs (TCs) for 15 MW Wind Project.
CDM
Structure
Total TCs
(Euro
000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Phase 1 TCs
(Euro 000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Phase 2 TCs
(Euro 000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Level 1 392 0.91 61 0.14 331 0.77
Level 2 446 1.03 61 0.14 385 0.89
Level 3 610 1.41 61 0.14 549 1.27
Table 10: Transaction Costs (TCs) for 1 MW PV Project.
CDM
Structure
Total TCs
(Euro
000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Phase 1 TCs
(Euro 000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Phase 2 TCs
(Euro 000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Level 1 387 79.0 57 11.6 330 67.4
Level 2 441 90.1 57 11.6 386 78.8
Level 3 605 123.6 57 11.6 548 111.9
Table 11: Transaction Costs (TCs) for 100 kW PV Project.
CDM
Structure
Total TCs
(Euro
000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Phase 1 TCs
(Euro 000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Phase 2 TCs
(Euro 000s)
Euro/
Ton C
Level 1 387 790 57 116 330 674
Level 2 441 900 57 116 386 788
Level 3 605 1235 57 116 548 1119
The differing absolute transaction cost estimates reflect the fact that the renewable
projects, (shown in Table 9 – Table 11), with zero emissions require minimal verification
effort in the implementation phase (phase 2). The results also confirm the fact, that total
transaction costs increase when more OEs are involved in a project. More significantly is
12
however the fact, that the transaction costs expressed per ton of carbon reduced rise
strongly as the size of the project becomes smaller. 
Note that these results are for the first year of operation. PwC state that they would
expect a learning curve effect in subsequent years such that the verification cost
component of the project cycle would be 20% lower in these subsequent years. 
Only recently, transaction costs became an issue in the discussion on the Kyoto
mechanisms. Simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale CDM projects were
adopted at the eighth Conference of the Parties in November of 2002, in New Delhi. The
elaboration of baselines and monitoring methodologies is currently being undertaken by
the Methodologies Panel of the Executive Board.
3.4 EcoSecurities
EcoSecurities (2000) provides estimates of the transaction costs for JI electricity
generation projects, assuming that JI requirements will be similar to the CDM project
cycle. Transaction cost estimates are applied in net present value calculations for two
project types: 
 150MW gas plant, 20 year lifetime, resulting in reductions of 350,000 tCO2/year;
 2MW biomass plant, 20 year lifetime, resulting in reductions of 35,000 tCO2/year. 
The data is presented in Table 12 and gives ranges of transaction costs on the basis of 50
similar energy sector projects. The ranges of transaction costs reflect the relative
complexity – and therefore resource requirements – that these projects need.
EcoSecurities suggest2, for example, that a wind project is likely to be typical for the
lower range of transaction costs whilst a bio-mass CHP or landfill project is more
representative for the top end of the range. 
The EcoSecurities estimates are country generic and do not differentiate according to
size of project, since they argue that a similar amount of time/resources is required for
the project cycle activities, regardless of project size. As a consequence, the transaction
costs expressed as per ton of carbon reduced are lower, the larger the project (in terms of
                                                          
2 Paul Soffe, EcoSecurities, personal communication, 15 May 2001.
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size of resulting emission reductions). The two above mentioned projects are both
medium or large sized projects with small costs per t CO2 reduced.
Jotzo and Michaelowa (2001) propose emission reduction unit (ERU) market price
estimates of 1-5€ per ton CO2. This leads to the following transaction cost ranges for the
above projects:
Table 12: JI Transaction Cost Estimates for Gas Plant.
JI Project Cycle Transaction Cost (€ 000s)
Pre-Implementation phase
Search 12 – 20
Negotiation 25 – 45
Validation 10– 15
Approval 10
Total Pre-Impl. Phase 57 – 90
Implementation phase ERU value 1 €/t ERU value 5 €/t
Monitoring (annual) 3 – 15
Certification 5-10% of ERU value
Gas plant* 17.5 – 35 87.5 – 175
Biomass plant* 1.75 – 3.5 8.75 – 17.5
Enforcement (annual) 1-3% of ERU value
Gas plant* 3.5 – 10.5 17.5 – 51.5
Biomass plant* 0.35 – 1.05 1.75 –5.15
Total Implementation Phase (20 years, undiscounted)
Gas plant* 480 – 1,210 2,160– 4,830
Biomass plant* 102 – 391 270 – 753
Total Project Cycle
Gas plant* 
(costs per t CO2)
537 – 1,300
(0.1 – 0.2€/t)
2,217 – 4,920 
(0.3 – 0.7 €/t)
Biomass plant* 
(costs per t CO2)
159 – 481
(0.2 – 0.7€/t)
327 - 843
(0.4 – 1.1 €/t)
Source: EcoSecurities (2000), own calculations
* Reductions as quoted above
The calculation shows that the bulk of costs falls on certification and enforcement costs.
However, it is very unlikely that there will be no reduction of costs in later years of a
project. In addition to this certification costs are expected to decline with the amount of
certificates and therefore be not proportional to the amount of ERUs.
3.5 Comparison of JI/CDM Type Transaction Costs
The analysis above has identified estimates of transaction costs for the JI and CDM
project types established under the Kyoto Protocol. The estimates are derived from
different sources and reflect different institutional procedures. Consequently, the
14
transaction costs may not be directly comparable. Nevertheless, due to the consistency in
the range estimates of the values presented above, we are confident that these will
approximate the transaction costs in the first commitment period. It is apparent, in any
case, that a number of the current PCF and UNFCCC projects will convert to JI status -
as one PCF project already has. The exception to this is the possibility for streamlining
CDM - the details for which are still currently being worked out. This is discussed
separately below.
Table 13: Classification of Project Sizes for JI Projects.
Type Reduction (t/a) Low (€/ton C) Central (€/ton C) High (€/ton C)
Very large > 50,000 0.05 0.1 0.2
Large 5,000 - 50,000 0.5 1 2
Medium – upper 500 - 5,000 3 10 15
Medium – lower 50 - 500 35 100 300
Small < 50 400 500 600
Table 14: Classification of Project Sizes for CDM Projects.
Type Reduction (t/a) Low (€/ton C) Central (€/ton C) High (€/ton C)
Very large > 50,000 0.08 0.2 1
Large 5,000 - 50,000 0.25 0.5 2
Medium – upper 500 - 5,000 5 10 15
Medium – lower 50 - 500 67 100 300
Small  < 50 670 1,000 2000
Table 15: Correlation of Projects and Project Size.
Type Typical projects
Very large Large hydro, gas power plants, large CHP, geothermal, landfill/pipeline
methane capture, cement plant efficiency, large-scale afforestation
Large Wind power, solar thermal, energy efficiency in large industry
Medium – upper Boiler conversion, DSM, small hydro
Medium – lower Energy efficiency in housing and SME, mini hydro
Small PV
The data is most usefully expressed in terms of transaction costs per ton of carbon
reduced. Clearly, if the costs per ton of carbon are too high, this will prohibit an
otherwise profitable carbon exchange. As can be seen from the data reported from
individual sources above, there is a strong correlation between the size of project in
terms of carbon reductions, and costs per ton of carbon. This pattern is highlighted in
Table 13 and Table 14, which present a categorisation that roughly fits the different data
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sources for JI and CDM projects respectively. Table 15 presents typical project types for
the different project sizes.
Whilst the data for JI and CDM projects are presented separately, the ranges that we have
adopted to account for project specification, location etc., do not allow us to identify
significant cost differences between the two instruments. Indeed, communication with
the PCF3, suggests that estimates for both instruments will fall substantially over time as
learning effects, combined with increased competition in these markets, bring cost
reductions in both the pre-implementation and implementation project phases. The 20%
cost reduction in the implementation phase assumed by PwC may therefore be seen as a
minimum reduction.
As noted above, the provision of streamlined procedures for small scale CDM projects
means that these projects will have significantly lower transaction costs than presented
above. The Parties agreed that the following categories of small-scale project activities
are eligible under simplified procedures:
 Renewable energy projects with a maximum output capacity of 15 megawatts. 
 Energy efficiency improvement projects that reduce energy consumption by up to 15
gigawatt hours per year. 
 Other project activities that reduce anthropogenic emissions by source, which
directly emit less than 15 kilotonnes of CO2 equivalent annually.
Thus, the medium-low and small categories in Table 14 above can be adjusted to the
levels presented in Table 16. 
Table 16: Transaction Costs for Streamlined Small-Scale CDM Projects (PwC).
Type Reduction (t/a) Low (€/ton C) Central (€/ton C) High (€/ton C)
Medium – lower 50 - 500 6 9 27
Small  < 50 60 90 180
The estimates presented in Table 16 may, however, differ from those generated when the
CDM becomes operational. This is because two further streamlining rules - not
anticipated in the PwC analysis - have been recommended. These are:
                                                          
3 Ken Newcombe, PCF, personal communication 19 April, 2001
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 the allowance for unilateral projects (where projects are developed, financed and
implemented by the host country).
 The bundling of small-scale projects that are similar (so that the international CDM
investor only has to deal with the organisation that bundles the projects).
The adoption of these two rules may mean that further reductions in transaction costs
than identified in Table 16 may be possible. However, no quantitative estimates exist of
such reductions at present. 
3.6 International Emissions Trading (IET)
The estimation of transaction costs associated with IET is even more problematic than is
the case for JI and CDM-type projects. This is because there has been little experience to
date in the operation of internationally-based emission trading schemes. There is as yet
no evidence on transaction costs that arise on domestic carbon trading e.g. in UK and
Denmark. On the other hand, there is some evidence on transaction costs that have been
incurred in domestic trading schemes for other pollutants than carbon, e.g. lead and SO2
in the US. However, caution is urged in transferring transaction cost estimates from these
schemes, since in international emissions trading search and negotiation costs are likely
to be more significant, as the levels of technical competence will differ broadly among
the firms in different countries, compared to domestic programs (Woerdman, 2001). 
US SO2 Allowances Trading
Tietenberg et al. (1999) emphasise that transaction costs play a key role in the success or
failure of emission trading systems. Some national emissions trading schemes, like the
U.S. SO2 allowances trading programme introduced in the 1990 Amendment to the Clean
Air Act, proved to be very successful. The evidence on transaction costs under this
programme is not transparent. However, brokerage fees – which are likely to be the most
significant component of transaction costs in trading schemes – are estimated to be in the
range of 2% to 5% of the transaction value (Klaassen and Nentjes, (1997), and Joskow
et. al. (1998). This magnitude is supported by Solomon (1995) and Montero (1997), who
estimate transaction costs to be 5% and 8% of the transaction value, respectively.
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US Lead Trading
Kerr and Maré (1997) provide quantitative estimates for transaction costs in lead permit
trading. They state that transaction costs in the market between 1982 and 1987 were
equivalent to 10% of the total transaction value.
Transferring these estimates to the carbon IET context a key determining factor will be
the number of participants in the market (Woerdman, 2001). Theory suggests that
transaction costs will decline as the number of potential traders and the number of
transactions per source increase (Stavins, 1995). The estimates from US experience
presented above have been derived in national markets with a large number of
participants. The number of participants in carbon IET context will depend on the detail
of the market design that finally emerges from the Conference of Parties. The scheme for
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the EU, which is envisaged for the
period 2005 to 2008, covers large installations of energy-intensive industries. Therefore
the number of participants will be large and we would expect to see transaction costs
equating to 2 – 4% of total transaction value. 
On the other hand, several problems will arise in the operation of trading schemes at an
international level, that are not existent at a national level. These include the difficulty of
installing appropriate monitoring and penalty systems and, for the national inventories,
monitoring their overall emissions. An estimate of 10% (Barrett, 1995) has therefore
been suggested. However, as for JI and CDM projects, a learning effect is expected in
emissions trading so that transaction costs are likely to be higher in initial stages of a
trading program. This is in line with the experience of the U.S. trading schemes (see
studies by Gangadharan (2000) and Aidt and Dutta (2001)) and suggests that over time
10% may be too high.
4 Estimates of Project Risk Premia
In addition to transaction costs, projects in different sovereign states may attract different
risk premia owing to the perceived level of risk of default or project failure due to micro-
level or macro-level factors. For instance, past actions such as default on loans may
impact upon this perceived level of risk, as may macroeconomic variables such as
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inflation and the perceived level of economic development in the economy. This section
focuses on the issue of the determination of the different types of risk faced by projects
and identifies estimates for risk premia that can be used in the modelling applications.
4.1 Determining the Risk Premia
Dailami and Liepziger (1999) suggest that the required rate of return for a project in a
given country is the sum of the risk-free interest rate and a risk premium that reflects the
market's assessment of country and project risk.
Risk premia estimation can be based on a number of variables at both country and
project level. These include: past projects, sovereign debt ratings, equity values and risk.
Econometric analysis tries to incorporate both country and project level risk, and
separates these two levels of risk through the use of macroeconomic and project level
indicators as explanatory variables in regression analysis. One study is Dailami and
Liepziger (1999) which uses a sample of 26 greenfield infrastructure projects4 to estimate
the credit risk premium and relate these to macroeconomic and project-specific variables.
The macroeconomic variables included the rate of inflation, GDP per capita, ratio of
external debt to exports, ratio of short term debt to foreign exchange reserves and the
ratio of reserves to imports. Project size, leverage ratio (proportion of project loan to total
project cost) and sector-specific dummy variables were used to estimate the impact of
project-specific variables. 
Given that CDM and JI projects are to be placed in developing countries and economies
in transition, the above analysis suggests that differential risk premia may have to be
used in project analysis. One technique is to calculate risk premia for different countries
using equity returns and risk of default compared to a base country. Damadoran
(undated) presents a methodological framework from which the risk premia for equities
in different countries can be estimated. Damadoran (1999) calculates this for the USA
relative to a number of other countries in the world, using average default spreads for
different credit rankings. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 18. The
estimates can be used as rough indicators of the country risk element to be applied to
                                                          
4 Note that this study was based on an initial sample of 78 projects. Of these projects, only 26 had
sufficient data for the analysis of the risk premia. 
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projects in the different countries since they relate the risk of failure to the countries own
rating. The credit rating of an individual firm within a nation, and thus the cost of
financing a project, is unlikely to be below that of the national government, given that
financial resources are open to the government.
Table 17 reports the average risk premium attributed to countries of different credit
ratings. Clearly, the level of risk rises as the credit rating falls. 
Table 17: Average Risk Premia by Credit Ranking.
Credit 
Ranking
Ave Risk 
premia
Aaa 0.00%
Aa1 0.60%
Aa2 0.65%
Aa3 0.70%
A2 0.90%
A3 0.95%
Baa1 1.20%
Baa2 1.30%
Baa3 1.45%
Ba1 2.50%
Ba2 3.00%
Ba3 4.00%
B1 4.50%
B2 5.50%
B3 6.50%
Caa 7.50%
Source: own estimates based on Damodaran (1999).
These average risk premia in different countries provide the basis for first estimations of
the country risk premia to which projects under JI and CDM are exposed.
As noted above, one dynamic extension to the straight adoption of the values given in
Table 18 is to relate forecast macro-economic indices for individual countries to the
changes in credit rating (and therefore risk premia) that these indices would imply. This
would be possible as long as the relationships between the indices and the credit rating
are quantified. In a similar exercise, Cantor and Packer (1996) examined the extent to
which sovereign credit ratings were determined by such variables, using econometric
analysis of Standard and Poors' and Moodys' credit rating systems. Table 19 presents the
main results of this analysis.
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Table 18: Estimates of Country Risk Premia for Equities.
Country
Long-Term 
Rating
Adj. Default 
Spread
Total Risk 
Premium
Country 
Risk 
Premium Country
Long-
Term 
Rating
Adj. 
Default 
Spread
Total Risk 
Premium
Country 
Risk 
Premium
Alderney Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00% Ecuador Caa2 750 13.01% 7.50%
Andorra Aa1 60 6.11% 0.60% Egypt Ba1 250 8.01% 2.50%
Argentina B2 550 11.01% 5.50% El Salvador Baa3 145 6.96% 1.45%
Australia Aa2 65 6.16% 0.65% Estonia Baa1 120 6.71% 1.20%
Austria Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00% Eurozone Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00%
Bahamas A3 95 6.46% 0.95% Fiji Islands Ba2 300 8.51% 3.00%
Bahamas - Off 
Shore Banking 
Center Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00% Finland Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00%
Bahrain Ba1 250 8.01% 2.50% France Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00%
Bahrain - Off 
Shore Banking 
Center A3 95 6.46% 0.95% Germany Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00%
Barbados Baa2 130 6.81% 1.30% Gibraltar Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00%
Belgium Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00% Greece WR 750 13.01% 7.50%
Belize Ba2 300 8.51% 3.00% Guatemala Ba2 300 8.51% 3.00%
Bermuda Aa1 60 6.11% 0.60% Guernsey Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00%
Bolivia B1 450 10.01% 4.50% Honduras B2 550 11.01% 5.50%
Botswana A2 90 6.41% 0.90% Hong Kong A3 95 6.46% 0.95%
Brazil B1 450 10.01% 4.50% Hungary A3 95 6.46% 0.95%
Bulgaria B2 550 11.01% 5.50% Iceland Aa3 70 6.21% 0.70%
Canada Aa1 60 6.11% 0.60% India Ba2 300 8.51% 3.00%
Cayman Islands Aa3 70 6.21% 0.70% Indonesia B3 650 12.01% 6.50%
Cayman Islands - 
Off Shore Banking 
Center Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00% Iran B2 550 11.01% 5.50%
Chile Baa1 120 6.71% 1.20% Ireland AA2 65 6.16% 0.65%
China A3 95 6.46% 0.95% Isle of Man Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00%
Colombia Ba2 300 8.51% 3.00% Israel A2 90 6.41% 0.90%
Costa Rica Ba1 250 8.01% 2.50% Italy WR 750 13.01% 7.50%
Croatia Baa3 145 6.96% 1.45% Jamaica Ba3 400 9.51% 4.00%
Cuba Caa1 750 13.01% 7.50% Japan Aa1 60 6.11% 0.60%
Cyprus A2 90 6.41% 0.90% Jersey Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00%
Czech Republic Baa1 120 6.71% 1.20% Jordan Ba3 400 9.51% 4.00%
Denmark Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00% Kazakhstan B1* 450 10.01% 4.50%
Dominican 
Republic B1 450 10.01% 4.50% Korea Baa2 130 6.81% 1.30%
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Table 18: continued.
Source: Damodaran (1999)
Country
Long-
Term 
Rating
Adj. 
Default 
Spread
Total Risk 
Premium
Country 
Risk 
Premium Country
Long-
Term 
Rating
Adj. 
Default 
Spread
Total Risk 
Premium
Country 
Risk 
Premium
Kuwait Baa1 120 6.71% 1.20% Russia B2 550 11.01% 5.50%
Latvia Baa2 130 6.81% 1.30% San Marino A2 90 6.41% 0.90%
Lebanon B1 450 10.01% 4.50% Sark Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00%
Liechtenstein Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00% Saudi Arabia Baa3 145 6.96% 1.45%
Lithuania Ba1 250 8.01% 2.50% Singapore Aa1 60 6.11% 0.60%
Luxembourg Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00% Slovakia Ba1 250 8.01% 2.50%
Macau Baa1 120 6.71% 1.20% Slovenia A2 90 6.41% 0.90%
Malaysia Baa2 130 6.81% 1.30% South Africa Baa3 145 6.96% 1.45%
Malta A3 95 6.46% 0.95% Spain Aa1 60 6.11% 0.60%
Mauritius Baa2 130 6.81% 1.30% Sweden Aa1 60 6.11% 0.60%
Mexico Baa3 145 6.96% 1.45% Switzerland Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00%
Moldova B3 650 12.01% 6.50% Taiwan Aa3 70 6.21% 0.70%
Monaco Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00% Thailand Baa3 145 6.96% 1.45%
Morocco Ba1 250 8.01% 2.50%
Trinidad & 
Tobago Baa3 145 6.96% 1.45%
Netherlands Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00% Tunisia Baa3 145 6.96% 1.45%
New Zealand Aa2 65 6.16% 0.65% Turkey B1 450 10.01% 4.50%
Nicaragua B2 550 11.01% 5.50% Turkmenistan B2 550 11.01% 5.50%
Norway Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00% Ukraine Caa1 750 13.01% 7.50%
Oman Baa2 130 6.81% 1.30%
United Arab 
Emirates A2 90 6.41% 0.90%
Pakistan Caa1 750 13.01% 7.50%
United 
Kingdom Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00%
Panama Baa1 120 6.71% 1.20%
United States 
of America Aaa 0 5.51% 0.00%
Panama - Off 
Shore Banking 
Center Aa2 65 6.16% 0.65% Uruguay Baa3 145 6.96% 1.45%
Papua New 
Guinea B1 450 10.01% 4.50% Venezuela B2 550 11.01% 5.50%
Paraguay B2 550 11.01% 5.50% Vietnam B1 450 10.01% 4.50%
Peru Ba3 400 9.51% 4.00%
Philippines Ba1 250 8.01% 2.50%
Poland Baa1 120 6.71% 1.20%
Portugal A3 95 6.46% 0.95%
Qatar Baa2 130 6.81% 1.30%
Romania B3 650 12.01% 6.50%
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Table 19: Determinants of Sovereign Debt Ratings.
Dependent Variable
Explanatory variable Average
Ratings
Moody’s
Ratings
Standard and
Poor’s Ratings
Moody’s/Standard
and Poor’s Rating
Differencesa
Intercept 1.442
(0.633)
3.408
(1.379)
-0.524
(0.223)
3.932**
(2.521)
Per capita income 1.242***
(5.302)
1.027***
(4.041)
1.458***
(6.048)
-0.431***
(2.688)
GDP Growth 0.151*
(1.935)
0.130
(1.545)
0.171**
(2.132)
-0.040
(0.756)
Inflation -0.611***
(2.839)
-0.630***
(2.701)
-0.591***
(2.671)
-0.039
(0.265)
Fiscal balance 0.073
(1.324)
0.049
(0.818)
0.097*
(1.71)
-0.048
(1.274)
External balance 0.003
(0.314)
0.006
(0.535)
0.001
(0.046)
0.006
(0.779)
External debt -0.013***
(5.088)
-0.015***
(5.365)
-0.011***
(4.236)
-0.004
(2.133)
Indicator for economic
development
2.776***
(4.25)
2.957***
(4.175)
2.595***
(3.861)
0.362
(0.81)
Indicator for default
history
-2.042***
(3.175)
-1.463**
(2.097)
-2.622***
(3.962)
1.159***
(2.632)
Adjusted R-squared 0.924 0.905 0.926 0.251
Standard error 1.222 1.325 1.257 0.836
Source: Cantor and Packer (1996) 
Notes: The sample size is forty-nine. Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.
aThe number of rating notches by which Moody’s ratings exceed Standard and Poor’s.
*Significant at the 10 percent level
** Significant at the 5 percent level
***Significant at the 1 percent level
Table 19 shows that per capita income - an indicator of the level of political stability or the
tax base from which a sovereign government can draw to repay debts - is statistically
significant in all ratings. Similarly, inflation is significant in all equations, with a negative
sign, indicating that a high level of inflation has a negative impact on the perception of risk
of default. This one would expect as inflation is often associated with underlying structural
problems in the economy. A negative relationship is shown between the ratings level and
external debt, indicating that the higher the level of debt taken by a country the higher the
level of risk involved with additional loans. Economic development, measured by a dummy
variable showing whether a country is considered "industrialised" by the International
Monetary Fund, has a positive effect on the ratings. Default history also has a significant
impact, with the indicator showing whether a country has defaulted on a loan since 1970
having a negative influence on the ratings. GDP growth is significant at the 10% level in
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equation with average ratings as the dependent variable. The adjusted R-squared values for
all three equations based solely on ratings are high, suggesting a high level of accuracy,
which is borne out by assessment of the strength of the equation system in predicting
sovereign ratings, with no predictions for countries being very far from the actual rankings.
This indicates that the parameters from this equation can be used to derive estimates of credit
ratings for countries or regions that as yet do not have credit ratings.
4.2 Recommendations
The risk premia applied to projects in developing countries and economies in transition may
be crucial in determining whether a project goes ahead or not. Hence the determination of the
risk premia may play a central role in the development of CDM or JI projects in developing
countries. Several studies have examined the determinants of such risk premia, and a number
of investment organisations provide ratings for investment risk in developing countries. The
work by Damodaran (1999, undated) is of particular use since it provides estimates of risk
premia for different countries based on average levels of risk in equity markets. Combined
with the estimation of the determinants of credit rankings by Cantor and Packer (1996) it
may provide the basis for an iterative model of risk premia for countries as they develop
through the timeframe of the simulation process. This would be valuable in future
simulations since it may indicate the additional premia needed for CDM and JI projects to be
accepted for financing by governments, international institutions and corporations seeking to
gain carbon credits.
These estimates, however, only give a lower bound of the country risk involved in project
investment in any country. The same is true of estimates based on equity returns and risk of
default. Analysis of project level data is required to examine the levels of project level risk
and country level risk in developing countries. A study by Dailami et al (2001) includes
project-level variables but does not report complete econometric results and does not present
the data set on which the econometric analysis is based. 
5 Summary and Conclusion
It is evident that transaction costs are significant cost elements in the proposed
implementation of the flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, it is likely
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that they will matter in the decision as to whether an individual JI or CDM project will be
undertaken or not. The existing data illustrates, that the absolute level of transaction costs is
similar across all project types. Therefore the size of a project is significant for the costs per
ton of carbon reduced. While the effect of transaction costs on large projects is negligible
they will be prohibitive for small projects. This will therefore prevent the undertaking of
projects that are otherwise cost effective, and may even lead to the exclusion of some
countries from participating in CDM-projects.
The strong impact of transaction costs on the uptake of small projects underlines the
importance of simplified modalities for small-scale projects, which were decided in the
Marrakech Accords. An elaborate project cycle may enhance up-front transaction costs but
lower them ex post. Moreover, rules that enhance transparency will be critical to reduce
search costs even if they entail ex-ante costs. Dudek and Wiener (1996) argue for a voluntary
bulletin board; the UNFCCC CDM Executive Board will develop a website where project
ideas can be posted. Funds such as the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) can reduce transaction
costs by developing generic procedures such as standardised contracts. They can also
specialise in certain project types. 
Further methods for reducing transaction costs include 
 Bundling of projects to jointly undertake each step of the project cycle
 Verification and certification undertaken not annually but at long intervals
 Exemption of projects from one or more steps of the project cycle; this however
endangers environmental credibility and could lead to moral hazard. 
 Streamlining of information that is needed for each step of the project cycle
It is worth noting at this point that the answer to the question of who bears the transaction
costs may be important in determining their effect on the up-take of the flexible mechanisms.
At this stage in the establishment of the mechanisms it is impossible to say whether public or
private sector agents will be liable for the costs, and how this liability will affect the up-take.
One can envisage, however, a future where the burden shifts from public to private sectors
over time as learning effects reduce costs.
While the importance of project size is apparent, there is not enough data to draw detailed
conclusions on which countries or sectors are likely to have lower or higher transaction costs.
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However, the renewable energy sector projects will have relatively low costs since
monitoring in the implementation phase will have negligible costs.
The analysis on emissions trading showed that transaction costs are vital to the success or
failure of an emissions trading scheme. Since there does not exist an international emissions
trading scheme yet, transaction costs can only be quantified for national trading programmes.
Data from such schemes, like the SO2 or lead trading markets in the U.S. points out the
importance of brokerage fees, which constitute the major part of transaction costs, and
learning effects, which lead to an increase of trade and decrease of transaction costs in later
years of trading programs.
In order to keep transaction costs low it will be desirable to build on the experience with past
emissions trading schemes. Some problems do however occur in transferring the concept of
national trading schemes to an international level. These include the difficulty to install
appropriate monitoring and penalty systems and, for the national inventories, to precisely
specify their overall emissions. 
Experience with national emissions trading schemes provides transaction cost values given in
per cent of traded volume. We think that total average transaction costs at the beginning of a
trading program will constitute 10% of the traded volume and decrease gradually to
approximately 2% of the traded volume, due to learning effects.
A key additional motivation for estimating the transaction costs associated with the different
flexibility mechanisms is that the non-compliance penalty will be effective only if it is larger
than the net costs of using the flexibility mechanisms. In a similar vein, if the net costs for JI
and CDM, including transaction costs and risk premia, don’t equal the net costs for IET, the
up-take of individual flexible mechanisms will be affected. Continued monitoring of their
current and proposed implementation will be necessary to determine what strategy should be
taken in the next decade in promoting the different individual mechanisms. It is not yet clear,
how far the transaction costs will be reduced through streamlining, learning effects, etc.,
however, it can be expected, that streamlining will lead to similar marginal costs for all three
flexible mechanisms.
Risk premia constitute another important factor in the determination whether a project is
undertaken or not. This holds in particular for projects in developing countries and
economies in transition. We have determined country risk premia, based on Damodaran
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(1999), that can be used as rough estimates of the country risk element to be applied to
projects in the different countries. Since project-specific risk premia were not yet available,
further research in this area is recommended in order to better be able to analyse take-up of
the flexibility instruments. 
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